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Court of Law and Court of Public Opinion
Symbiotic Regulation
of the Corporate Management Duty of Care
Tamar Frankel•

Abstract: In In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation the Delaware court exonerated
the defendants for their handling of the Ovitz Affair, and yet condemned them. It is a
classic example of how a court of law can make law without making law. By an obiter
dictum, the Chancellor established the facts of the case and footnoted the sources much
like a treatise or a casebook, recounted the general principles of the law, used strong
words to describe the defendants’ behavior, delved into the moral and business judgment
of the defendants, and assisted the market in judging and enforcing its best practices. The
Disney decision is a political masterpiece. (1) It pleases management because it sets a
legal standard that is admittedly lower than the market “best practices” standard and
issues a judgment for the defendants. As to the duty of care, the court elevates market
morals above legal morals. (2) It pleases the Delaware Bar and perhaps members of other
bars, as well as the shareholders’ advocates, because it lowers the standard of demand
requirement and opens the door to class actions. Hence it does not reduce the number of
cases against management. (3) It discloses and documents aspects of internal
management, including the personalities and behavior of the actors, thus inviting critics,
public opinion and the media to supervise management and influence management’s
business judgment. It maintains the courts’ “hands off” approach and low standard of
negligence in evaluating the business judgment of management and board of directors.
(4) It allows the courts to establish the facts and offer their opinion without serious threat
of being overruled by higher courts or the legislature. (5) The decision shifts the burden
of chastising management in cases such as Disney to the market and the media. All in
120 pages. The issue is whether this is a good way to go about resolving situations such
as Disney. I conclude that it is. Unlike criminal cases, in which the Court of Public
Opinion may prejudice the jury, the Court of Public Opinion is more suitable than the
Court of Law to judge excesses by corporate directors and management so long as those
do not amount to violations of trust and honesty (the duty of loyalty).
INTRODUCTION
The story of the Disney Corporation, Michael Eisner and Michael Ovitz. On August
9, 2005, the Delaware Chancery Court handed down a decision that exonerated the
defendant directors of Disney Company and its top management from liability for their
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handling of the Ovitz Affair.1 The story is quite simple. Disney’s president died in an
accident, and the corporation’s CEO, Michael Eisner, underwent a heart operation.
Disney needed a successor president and immediate help to its ailing CEO. Eisner, who
has been courting his friend, the famous Michael Ovitz, for years, approached him again.
As this was an opportune time for Ovitz as well, the deal was struck, and Ovitz moved to
Disney as its president .The new president did not work out. He did not merge into the
Disney culture, had difficulties in being close to the very commanding and demanding
Eisner, and to two top executives, who were resentful to Ovitz, continued to report to
Eisner. After about one year, Ovitz’s contract with Disney was terminated. The
termination, after about a year of unsatisfactory service, cost Disney about $140 million.
Disney’s board approved both the employment contract with Ovitz, and its termination.

Disney’s shareholders sued management and the board of directors for violating their
fiduciary duty of care. The court initially held that the plaintiff-shareholders did not have
to make demand on the board.2 The decision opened the door to a full-fledged trial. At
the conclusion of the trial the court held for the defendants-management and directors.

The story is not particularly unique, even though the amount that a departing president
received after about a year’s questionable performance can raise eyebrows. Disney is a
large corporation and the payment to the departing president did not make a dent in its
budget.3 And, after all, before Ovitz joined Disney he was earning approximately $20-25
million a year.4 He could be entitled to a severance fee of this magnitude.

In part, the public’s interest in the case was due to the identity of Disney and reputation
of defendants. Not only were Eisner and Ovitz well known but so were the board
members, for example, the actor Sidney Poitier. Thus, a flurry of notes and articles has
1

In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt
Disney Co. Deriv. Litig.), 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
2
See also TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY, AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD 12627 (2006).
3
See Hoover’s Company Records – Basic Record, The Walt Disney Company (Dec. 26, 2006), LEXIS,
Company Library, Hvrcap File (noting that as of fiscal year date September 2006 Disney had annual sales
of $34.3 billion and net income of $3.4 billion).
4
Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d at 702.
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appeared during the trial and after the decision was delivered.5 For the lawyer, the case is
most interesting because it continues an illustrious history of cases that have had longterm impact for other than their ultimate legal holding. This case may set the form for
later judicial decisions involving directors and top management’s duty of care.

Some cases are continuously cited for their inspiring language, for example, Justice
Cardozo’s statement about the moral level of fiduciaries as compared to actors in the
market.6 Some cases are unique for their strategic decision, for example, the Marbury v.
Madison decision of the Supreme Court 7 that avoided President Jefferson’s refusal to
enforce it, and yet maintained a positive outcome. That is because the decision did not
require enforcement. That decision demonstrates a court’s strategy to establish its power
as against the President by producing an influential judgment that the President did not
have to enforce, and therefore did not have the opportunity to deny enforcement. A
number of features in the Disney case produce such extra-legal effects, which may be
long-term. It is a classic example, and a somewhat novel one, of how a court of law can
make law without making law by relegating the final judgment to the Court of Public
Opinion.

Chancellor Chandler established the facts of the case and footnoted the sources much like
a treatise or a casebook. Also, like a casebook or like the American Law Institute, the
Chancellor recounted the general principles of the law.8 The Chancellor used obiter
dictum to say what he thought about the defendants without binding himself or other
5

Recent Case, In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, No. Civ. A. 15452, 2005 WL 2056651 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 9, 2005), 119 HARV. L. REV. 923 (2006); John W. Anderson & Karen Pascale, The Disney Case: A
Virtual Roundtable Discussion, DEL. LAW., Winter 2005/2006, at 26. The AALS has called for submission
of papers to be discussed in the January 2007 annual meeting dedicated to the case. AALS, Call for
Papers, http://www.aals.org/am2007/papers.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2006).
6
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928):
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length,
are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than
the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.
7
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). For a brief summary of the decision, see Mark Strasser, Taking
Exception to Traditional Exceptions Clause Jurisprudence: On Congress’s Power to Limit the Court’s
Jurisdiction, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 125, 131-36.
8
In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 745-46 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, Brehm v. Eisner (In re
Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig.), 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
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Delaware courts to his opinions. The Chancellor used strong words, close to disrespectful
language, to describe the defendants’ behavior, and damned the defendant Michael
Ovitz’s behavior by faint, and sometimes amazingly perplexing, praise.

The decision cast a shadow on, and perhaps reversed in part Justice Cardozo’s view of
fiduciary and market morals. While Justice Cardozo viewed the morals of the market
place to be lower than the morals involved in the legal duties of fiduciaries, the
Chancellor implied that “corporate best practices” (that is, the morals of the market place)
may reach a higher level than the legal duties of care involved in such practices. Yet, in
both cases, the nature of the behavior was not entirely clear. Both could be characterized
as a breach of the duty of care or a violation of the duty of loyalty.

Most importantly, the Chancellor delved into the moral and business judgment of the
defendants, and in fact, seems to have addressed the defendants through the media. The
Delaware court left the final judgment in similar cases to the Court of Public Opinion.
The court, however, was not passive. It also facilitated the ability of the Court of Public
Opinion to reach a decision by providing it with facts that were verified under oath, and
by adding to these facts the non-binding opinion of the judge. It is as if the court
relegated the ultimate decision to the market, saying almost aloud: “In cases such as this
one, let you, The Court of Public Opinion -- the market, with the help of the media -decide!” Each of these features invites explanations. My explanations are speculative,
since I have not spoken to the Chancellor. I offer them as possible and plausible, in the
belief that they are very probable.

Thus, Part One of this Article describes some of the main features of the decision: The
extensive establishment and citation of the facts; the establishment and citation of the
law’ and the use of the words and rhetoric. Part Two of this Article discusses the court’s
evaluation of moral behavior and business judgment. Part Three of the Article notes the
court’s signals to the defendants and the address to the media. This Part deals with law
and the ideal corporate practice. It poses the question whether resorting to the Court of
Public Opinion in such cases as the Disney case is a better way to manage corporate

4

governance. This Part discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the approach and
concludes that the advantages to outweigh the disadvantages. This Part discusses the
possibilities that the Court of Public Opinion will be a flawed decision-maker; that
although management’s behavior may be seriously flawed, it would not have the drawing
interest that other cases, such as Disney, do; or that the media becomes an unfair
prosecutor of management. This Part of the article also discusses the question of whether
it is fair for judges to berate parties and witnesses I obiter dicta and the protection of
judges who do that. I conclude that notwithstanding these possibilities the approach of the
Disney Court is justified.

ONE. FACTS, LAW AND RHETORICS

Unlike most cases, the Disney decision lays-out and footnotes not only fact finding but
also the precise testimonies and the transcript places in which these testimonies can be
found. The Chancellor explained his motive for using his extensive authorities’
substantiation: He tabulated these facts to help the Appeals Court. This explanation
makes sense, although the form in which the Chancellor offered the materials is unusual.
Therefore, additional explanations may lurk in the background. First, whatever findings
the court makes, and whatever cites it offers, anyone who cites the facts is not exposed to
the risk of defamation or libel claims by the persons or organizations that are subjects of
these finding.9 Defamation is worrisome to many authors of books that describe cases
such as Disney. The decision constitutes an invitation to book and article writers. Second,
the Court’s materials are not sheltered by copyright.10 They can be freely copied by
anyone who would care to do so. Any writer about the characters and the stories in this
case need not worry about defamation or copyright. That is quite a relief.11
9

See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 415, at 1162 (2000) (noting common law “qualified privilege to
provide a fair and complete report of public proceedings and documents”; privilege not lost if reporter
knows facts are false); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1965); id. cmt. d (reporting of
governmental report is within scope of privilege).
10
See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) ( “‘[T]he law,’ whether it has its
source in judicial opinions or statutes, ordinances or regulations, is not subject to federal copyright law.”),
cert. denied, mot. granted, 539 U.S. 969 (2003).
11
Interestingly, the Chancellor does not explain why he believes some witnesses and not others.
Consequently he dismisses, and sometimes dismisses very bluntly, expert witnesses that based their
conclusions on a different interpretation of the facts. Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 740-45.
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The decision clearly states the facts the Chancellor believes, and those he does not
believe. His main focus and contribution, however, is in the interpretation of these facts.
Most importantly, he believes Michael Ovitz, whose story is rather difficult to
understand. Here is a man who is famous and admired, arrogant and enormously
demanding. This man does not like nor follow Disney’s corporate culture, and is
surrounded by people who do not like him.12 The plaintiff’s story was that Ovitz realized
that Disney was not a good place for him and that he started looking for another
employment very early on.13 The Chancellor’s understanding is that Ovitz wanted to try
and be good, but did not succeed.14 Ovitz was put in an untenable position. The two
managers under him refused to report to him and continued to report to Michael Eisner.15
Ovitz’s proposed deals were rejected.16 Moreover, Ovitz negotiated a position with
another employer, but failed to reach an agreement. It is unclear whether he did so at the
prodding of Eisner or on his own accord. It may have been both.17

Yet, the Chancellor finds that Ovitz had no inkling that he was close to termination, until
it was spelled out for him in spades.18 This powerful, famous and important man was
weeping—had “tears in his voice”—when he finally realized that he is being
terminated.19 This finding makes Michael Ovitz look like an incredibly stupid man, who
is inexperienced in the politics of corporate Hollywood. How realistic is this portrait?

Yet, this picture of Ovitz serves two purposes. It allows the Chancellor to reach the
conclusion that Ovitz did not agree to termination and was terminated against his wishes.
Therefore, he was entitled to the compensation under his employment contract. At the
same time this description undermines Ovitz’s reputation more than any berating of his

12

Id.at 713-14.
Id.at 714-22.
14
Id.
15
James B. Stewart, Partners: Eisner, Ovitz, and the Disney Wars, NEW YORKER, Jan. 10, 2005, at 46, 50
(both officers clearly refused to report to Ovitz).
16
Id. at 53.
17
Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 725.
18
Id. at 733.
19
Id.
13
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behavior would. This Machiavellian actor, who reigned over Hollywood for so long, was
terminated against his will and could do nothing about it. He was the punished bad boy
who found out that he reached the limit without knowing it. The punishment is also
suggestive. In addition to the millions he received, Ovitz asked for some “small”
concessions. The decision offers a meticulous list of the denial of all of Ovitz’s requests,
some picayune, some substantial.20 Once Ovitz accepted his fate, what did he ask for? He
asked for the company to buy his plane and his car. He asked for other small favors and
compensations.21 And here was Eisner saying No! No! No! Not only was Ovitz
terminated. Now it is documented that he did not even get the Disney to buy back his
plane and car! He was terminated with much money and much humiliation.

The hiring of Ovitz does not go unnoticed either. Before he entered into an employment
agreement, the corporation prepared for him an office that sounds like the Taj Mahal.22
And he was actively involved in the design and refurbishing of the office.23 But, against
the plaintiff’s arguments, the Chancellor finds that Ovitz was not employed by the
corporation at that time.24 No matter how one interprets these facts, they are damning. If
Ovitz was employed, as the Plaintiffs argued, he was employed without a contract. If he
was not employed, why did the corporation spend thousands of dollars on this lavish
office, according to his specifications and under his supervision? For a corporation that
20

Id. at 733 n.304.
Id. at 733 & n.304.
22
In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 283 (Del. Ch. 2003) (noting that other executives
reportedly called it an “excessively lavish office”), mot. granted, No. 15452-NC, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 109
(Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 2003), summary judgment granted in part, summary judgment denied in part, No. 15452,
2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 132 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 2004); Bernard Weinraub, Down, but Probably Not Out, in
Hollywood; Despite His Defeat in Disneyland, Ovitz Remains a Force to Reckon With, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
14, 1996, at 35, LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (stating that other executives said that he had a “huge
office and staff, even by Hollywood standards”). Diane Stafford, Average Pay of Top Big Oil CEOs: $32.7
Million, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 31, 2006, at D5, LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File
(noting report indicating that CEO-to-worker pay gap has increased from 107-to-1 to 411-to-1 from 1990 to
2005; report focused on oil company and defense contractor CEOs); Rik Kirkland, The Real CEO Pay
Problem, FORTUNE, July 10, 2006, at 78, LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (stating that “[c]orporate
America's executive-compensation system is broken”; even “CEOs are concerned about the uproar over
excessive executive compensation”); Enron Convictions End of a Shabby Story, NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma,
Wash.), May 26, 2006, at B06, LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (noting that “[e]xtravagantly excessive
compensation and perks for CEOs are drawing increasing scrutiny” in the post-Enron era; Home Depot’s
CEO received $245 million over “a period when the company's stock fell 12 percent, compared to Lowe's
gain of 173 percent”).
23
Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 714.
21
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does not provide its management with a limousine and requires its president and
chairman to ride with the rank and file executives in a bus, for heaven’s sake,25 this
behavior is quite surprising. And all these facts are documented.26 Thus, the Court’s
decision provides authors, academics, psychologists and behavioral economists with rich
materials to analyze and write about, to audiences’ delight.

It seems that Ovitz’s friendships were quite frail. One example is his relationship with
Eisner. Eisner wanted Ovitz at Disney as much for what Ovitz could bring to Disney as
for what he would not bring to a competitor.27 Once Ovitz was there, Eisner expected him
to fall in line and was furious when his friend failed to do so. Eisner’s behavior could be
interpreted as the desire to prevent Ovitz from succeeding in his job. Fury and perhaps
envy could have enkindled the insistence on termination, notwithstanding Ovitz’s
entreaties, and blank refusal to grant small requests. No friendship there. Another
example is Ovitz’s relationship with Ron Meyer. “Ovitz discovered that his close friend
and number two at CAA, Ron Meyer, was leaving for MCA. This revelation devastated
Ovitz, who had no idea Meyer was interested in leaving CAA, let alone leaving without
Ovitz.”28

The Establishment and Citation of the Law

Many Chancellors recite the law and cite cases on which they base their decisions. Many
Chancellors recite statutes, rules and the judicial precedents to be interpreted and
followed. This approach is not unique. In fact, it is the norm. Precedents and authorities
strengthen the decision.

However, in the Disney case the layout of the legal terrain is broader than the point on
which the decision is to be based. It is far more an overall view and review of the duty of
24

Id.
Id. at 713.
26
Id. at 714-15.
27
Id. at 702.
28
Id. at 701.
25
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care, with a side-interpretation of a famous case that stand in the way.29 That case,
however, was partially overruled by the legislature and is, as experienced lawyers
believe, a dead letter.30 In any event, this part of the decision resembles the Restatement
of the Law by the American Law Institute, although it lacks as many examples. The
judicial restatement includes reproduced and approved parts of law reviews as well.31

Who needs this overview of the law? After all, the overview is not necessary to reach the
decision. It is obiter dictum. Why did the Chancellor toil to write it? And what is its
impact? The Chancellor answers these queries. He states his purpose: It is to be cited, as
the ALI would.32 The very generality of the overview statements make them applicable to
many different factual situations. Here is an exercise of legislation in the hope that this
judicial Restatement will be interpreted and used as legislation. It is an expansion of the
judicial function to generalized statements to be interpreted in the future by future
generations of Chancellors.33 In addition, this restatement of the law is addressed to the
media and the public as well. It influences, if not guides them, to the final judgment. It
points to the Court of Public Opinion.

The Use of the Words and Rhetoric
29

Id. at 745-56; id. at 755 & n.460 (interpreting Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)).
65 Del. Laws 544 (1986), codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001) (converting duty of care
to default rule).
31
See, e.g., Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 746 n.402 (long law review quotation on duties of due care and
loyalty) (quoting Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law
Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript of May 25, 2005 at 39-42 available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=728431)).
32
Id. at 698:
I have tried to outline carefully the relevant facts and law, in a detailed manner and with
abundant citations to the voluminous record. I do this, in part, because of the possibility
that the Opinion may serve as guidance for future officers and directors -- not only of The
Walt Disney Company, but of other Delaware corporations.
33
See Tara L. Dunn, The Developing Theory of Good Faith in Director Conduct: Are Delaware Courts
Ready to Force Corporate Directors to Go Out-of-Pocket After Disney IV?, 83 DENV. U.L. REV. 531, 575
(2005) (describing decision as “example of . . . a ‘genre of Delaware opinion’ that teaches without
imposing liability”) (quoting E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in
Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1406 (2005); Reza Dibadj, Delayering Corporate Law, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 469,
490-91 (stating that opinion “is interesting not so much for its predictable holding . . . but for its rhetoric”
and that “the opinion unravels into a morality tale”); David Marcus, Magic Kingdom of Delaware, DAILY
DEAL, June 16, 2006, LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (contrasting “matter of fact” opinion issued on
appeal with Chancery Court’s “musing” about ideal corporate governance practices).
30
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Chancellors have given us a rich, powerful, and sometimes beautiful literature. Court
decisions can be poetic,34 funny,35 moving, and awe-inspiring.36 The Disney decision is
replete with colorful words and phrases. Here are a number of examples (footnotes
omitted).
As I will explain in painful detail hereafter, there are many aspects
of defendants' conduct that fell significantly short of the best practices of
ideal corporate governance. Recognizing the protean nature of ideal
corporate governance practices, particularly over an era that has included
the Enron and WorldCom debacles, and the resulting legislative focus on
corporate governance, it is perhaps worth pointing out that the actions (and
the failures to act) of the Disney board that gave rise to this lawsuit took
place ten years ago, and that applying 21st century notions of best
practices in analyzing whether those decisions were actionable would be
misplaced. 37

This Court strongly encourages directors and officers to employ best
practices, as those practices are understood at the time a corporate decision
is taken. But Delaware law does not -- indeed, the common law cannot -34

See Justice Cardozo’s statement, supra note 6.
See, e.g., Sea-land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 519, 521 (7th Cir. 1991) (Bauer, Chief
Judge):
This spicy case finds its origin in several shipments of Jamaican sweet peppers. . . . PS
then stiffed Sea-Land on the freight bill . . . .
....

35

. . . Marchese runs all of these corporations . . . out of the same, single office, with the
same phone line, the same expense accounts, and the like. And how he does “run” the expense
accounts! . . . Marchese has used the bank accounts of these corporations to pay . . . personal
expenses, including alimony and child support payments to his ex-wife, education expenses for his
children, maintenance of his personal automobiles, health care for his pet -- the list goes on and
on. Marchese did not even have a personal bank account! With “corporate” accounts such as these,
who needs a personal one?”
36
United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551) (opinion by
Justice Story discussing evils of slavery); see A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Life of the Law: Values,
Commitment, and Craftsmanship, 100 HARV. L. REV. 795, 798 (1987) (describing opinion as “moving”).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); see Robert L. Tsai, Sacred Visions of Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1095,
1157 (2005) (noting Marbury’s “awe-inspiring rhetoric”).
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hold fiduciaries liable for a failure to comply with the aspirational ideal of
best practices, any more than a common-law court deciding a medical
malpractice dispute can impose a standard of liability based on ideal -rather than competent or standard-medical treatment practices, lest the
average medical practitioner be found inevitably derelict.38

[A] reasonably prudent CEO (that is to say, a reasonably prudent CEO
with a board willing to think for itself and assert itself against the CEO
when necessary) would not have acted in as unilateral a manner as did
Eisner when essentially committing the corporation to hire a second-incommand, appoint that person to the board, and provide him with one of
the largest and richest employment contracts ever enjoyed by a non-CEO.
I write, “essentially committing,” because although I conclude that legally,
Ovitz's hiring was not a “done deal” as of the August 14 OLA, it was clear
to Eisner, Ovitz, and the directors who were informed, that as a practical
matter, it certainly was a “done deal.”39

Eisner's actions in connection with Ovitz's hiring should not serve as a
model for fellow executives and fiduciaries to follow. His lapses were
many. He failed to keep the board as informed as he should have. He
stretched the outer boundaries of his authority as CEO by acting without
specific board direction or involvement. He prematurely issued a press
release that placed significant pressure on the board to accept Ovitz and
approve his compensation package in accordance with the press release.
To my mind, these actions fall far short of what shareholders expect and
demand from those entrusted with a fiduciary position. Eisner's failure to
better involve the board in the process of Ovitz's hiring, usurping that role

37

Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 697.
Id..
39
Id. at 762 (footnote omitted).
38
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for himself, although not in violation of law, does not comport with how
fiduciaries of Delaware corporations are expected to act.40

TWO. MORAL BEHAVIOR AND BUSINESS JUDGMENT

Perhaps the most powerful and important part of the decision is the denunciation of the
defendants who are absolved from legal responsibility. Time and again the decision
makes it clear that their behavior is unacceptable, although it is legal. For example:

Despite all of the legitimate criticisms that may be leveled at Eisner, especially at
having enthroned himself as the omnipotent and infallible monarch of his personal
Magic Kingdom, I nonetheless conclude, after carefully considering and weighing all
the evidence, that Eisner's actions were taken in good faith.41
Would the better course of action have been for Russell [legal counsel] to
have objectively verified Ovitz's income from CAA? Undoubtedly, yes.
Would it have been better if Russell had more rigorously investigated Ovitz's
background in order to uncover his past troubles with the Department of
Labor? Yes. Would the better course of action have been for someone other
than Eisner's personal attorney to represent the Company in the negotiations
with Ovitz? Again, yes. Have plaintiffs shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that Russell's actions on behalf of the Company were grossly
negligent (in that he failed to inform himself of all material information
reasonably available in making decisions) or that he acted in bad faith? No. I
conclude that Russell for the most part knew what he needed to know, did for
the most part what he was required to do, and that he was doing the best he
thought he could to advance the interests of the Company by facilitating a
transaction that would provide a legitimate potential successor to Eisner and

40
41

Id. at 762-63 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 763.

12

provide the Company with one of the entertainment industry's most influential
individuals.42
Negligence and Gross Negligence.
It is not clear whether the defendants violated their duty of care and whether the
business judgment rule protected them from legal liability. Directors are liable for
gross negligence in performing their duties but not for mere negligence. A
question that has not been settled and perhaps deserves an examination is whether
a continued negligent behavior that is ingrained in the corporate culture and
relationship between the CEO and the board could reach the level of gross
negligence by sheer repetition of such behavior. There are no clear precedents to
this effect, but the events in Disney may indicate that at some point a culture of
negligence can be judged as gross negligence. This case may just emit signals to
boards that they ought to exercise their own judgment on important matters, and
that choosing the president of the company may be such a matter. Yet, under the
law, it seems that the culture of Disney did not reach the bottom of negligence to
become gross negligence.

The Signals to the Defendants and Address to the Media

To whom is the Chancellor addressing his pejorative words and criticisms? The
defendants are absolved from responsibility. Presumably, that is all they care about. Well
. . . not quite. By telling the whole world what was happening within Disney the decision
allows us to become somewhat of a peeping tom, unveiling the internal machinations of
the defendants. Even though the defendants have not violated the law, the Chancellor
condemns their behavior as lack of care. His harshest words are reserved for Eisner
whom he calls an “imperial CEO.”43 He documents the fact that all members of the board
were Eisner’s long-term friends or closely related, such as an administrator of the school
that Eisner’s children went to, or his lawyer. He notes Eisner’s erratic behavior. He noted
twice Eisner’s testimony that Ovitz would be a formidable competitor, and so it is better
42

Id. at 764-65 (footnote omitted).

13

to have him in Disney’s camp.44 This statement explains that Ovitz was courted not so
much for his contributions to Disney but more to avoid his contributions to competitors.
If that is so, however, it is unclear why Eisner was so eager and persistent in trying to get
rid of Ovitz against his wishes quickly and ruthlessly, as the Chancellor so well
documents. Would not Ovitz then become an enemy and supporter of a competitor?
Would $130 or more million change him from a fierce supporter of competitors to less
fierce?

The reaction of news readers depends on the culture of their society. As Mark Roe has
noted, Americans do not easily reach the level of “rage” at executive compensation.45 It is
curiosity that would draw readers more than anger. This case, however, unveils some of
the behind-the-scene corporate management behavior and invites other sources of
information to follow suit. Not “prospectus transparency” but “story transparency” may
be powerful. This story is what investors would read. This information perhaps will invite
them to make their judgment and induce them to act.

Law and the Ideal Corporate Practice

What did the Chancellor achieve by this judgment form? At the outset the Chancellor
notes that the law is not as broad (or as demanding) as “ideal corporate governance.”46
The word “ideal” seems to suggest that the market “best practices” of corporate
governance represent a higher standard than the legal standard. The “ideal” to which
management should aspire is hovering far above the law. This is an interesting approach
since many would have assumed that best practices in the market place follow the law
rather than lead law and leaves it behind.

43

Id. at 760-63.
Id. at 702.
45
Mark J. Roe, Can Culture Constrain the Economic Model of Corporate Law?, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251,
1261 (2002) (“The average [person in France] hates the rich. Hate . . . . Not envy, as I might say would be
the dominant American parallel trait. Not admiration, as might lace some of American culture.”).
46
Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 697.
44
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One possible result of this emphasis on “ideal” best practices is that the practices will
become less “idealistic” and will follow the letter of the law. This directive would
therefore meet the demands and wishes of corporate management.

However, if the Delaware courts will open the doors to similar cases, and if the courts do
not allow these claims to be squashed by the demand requirement, then such cases would
be given the wide publicity that they deserve. If the Delaware courts then berate a
behavior that is unacceptable and then absolve the management or directors from
liability, the results would be similar to those that have occurred in the Disney case. That
is, the market will take over the punishment and enforcement. After all, Eisner was
removed. Ovitz got his millions but his reputation must have been tarnished, perhaps for
long.47 His demands may diminish in the future, but the story of his behavior documented
in the judicial decision may be too easy to read and harder to forget and dismiss. The
result is to reduce the pressure of investors for stricter court decisions or for moving State
regulation to the federal system.48 To be sure, plaintiffs’ lawyers may be more hesitant to
bring cases. In which case the Disney case will spell the death or reduction of
shareholders’ suits. Not necessarily, however. If defendants expect an open court and a
Disney-type decision they may settle before the hearings produce another meticulously
documented insider story.

Perhaps the Chancellor has achieved what Justice Marshall achieved 200 years ago. That
is, create a conservative decision that cannot be overruled easily, and at the same time
offer a huge number of pages containing obiter dicta statements that are fodder for the
public interest and curiosity in support market enforcement. Disney’s judgment is unique
in that it transfers the decision to the market, assisted by the media. The Chancellor is not
shy to opine about the business judgment of Eisner. In fact, the Chancellor dwells on the
business judgment more than many courts might. But there is no reason to appeal this
intrusion into the business judgment of the management because management has been
found not liable.
47

E.g., Andy Serwer, What if Eisner Had Listened to Ovitz?, FORTUNE, July 25, 2005, at 55, LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File (noting that his reputation was “in tatters” and “ha[d] been destroyed”).
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Public opinion seems to count especially when attention is drawn to the case. The
decision then carves out a process by which the media becomes aware of an issue and,
regardless of the legal results, reads the Chancellor’s opinion on a failed corporate
practice.

If certain conservative corporate management and the lawyers look to the final Court’s
decision, they may begin to reduce their “ideal corporate practice.” Yet, as much as the
Court refuses to guide corporate practice in the ratio decidendi of his decision he may
have achieved this purpose in his obiter dicta. The uncertainty will be lifted with the next
case. If the Court reduces the barriers of demand and hears the case, and if upon hearing
the case it points to the flaws in the corporate practice while exonerating the board and
management, a new era of court guidance to “idealistic corporate practice” may emerge.
The structure of this judgment seems to allow the Court to have its cake and eat it too: To
induce corporate America to stay in the Delaware jurisdiction, to protect Delaware from
intrusion of federal regulations, and to chastise management and corporate boards in the
process.

In sum, the Disney decision can be viewed as a political masterpiece.
(1) It pleases management because it sets a standard that is admittedly lower than the
market “best practices” standard.
(2) It discloses and documents aspects of internal management, including the
personalities and behavior of the actors. Thus, it invites criticisms of management,
rightly or wrongly. The decision invites public opinion and the media to supervise
management and intrude on its business judgment while allowing the courts to
establish the facts and even offer its opinion without the threat of being overruled by
higher courts or the legislature.
(3) Finally, the decision shifts the burden of chastising management in such a case to the
market with the help of the media. It unveils internal management dealings and
creates the transparency that the market needs. It does not reduce the number of cases
48

See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491 (2005).
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against management (if demand is not required in the shareholders’ derivative suits)
and yet retains Delaware’s corporate business and holding on to its management
clients (because the management is not found liable in such cases).

THREE. SIGNALS TO DEFENDANTS AND THE ADDRESS TO THE MEDIA

The question is whether this is a better way to manage and control corporate
governance. I believe it is, for the following reasons.
First, I note that the Court of Public Opinion has been active for years in the area of
public, political, and moral affairs.49 It has also emerged strong in the area of securities
acts violations 50 as well as corporate governance. Not surprisingly it has affected the
lawyers’ role as well. The media can be ruthless as well as supportive, and can harm
corporate management as well as the plaintiffs. “While at least one ethics scholar has
described the language in Justice Kennedy's opinion [to the effect that a lawyer may act
to protect his client’s reputation, and not confine his actions to the court] as ‘remarkable,’
the recent explosion of media attention to law has rekindled the debate over a lawyer's
proper role as an advocate outside the courtroom.” 51 Advocacy of lawyers in the Court of
Public Opinion is now a fixture on the legal scene. The question is whether the rules that
apply to the courtroom can also apply to the Court of Public Opinion.52

Second, reputation is crucial to most businesses and to their management. That is why
managers and boards of directors pay close attention to how the media portrays
49

See, e.g., the debate on abortion: Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican Schoolmaster: The
U.S. Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 751, 768 (1989); Mark A.
Graber, Popular Constitutionalism, Judicial Supremacy, and the Complete Lincoln-Douglas Debates, 81
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 923, 929 n.22 (2006) (citing Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican
Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 751, 768
(1989)).
50
Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulaition? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals
for Its Future, 51 DUKE L. J. 1397 (2002).
51
Jonathan M. Moses, Legal Spin Control: Ethics and Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, 95
COLUM.L. REV. 1811 (1995).
52
Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter O. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49 DUKE L.J. 1405, 1457 n.239
(2000) (“An attorney's duties do not begin inside the courtroom door . . . . An attorney may take reasonable
steps to defend a client's reputation and reduce the adverse consequences of indictment including an
attempt to demonstrate in the court of public opinion that the client does not deserve to be tried.”) (quoting
Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1043 (1991).
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themselves and their corporation. Reputation is not related merely to obedience to the
law. It can be tarnished by personal misbehavior, poor judgment, and personality flaws.
Such flaws may not reach the level of legal violation but can badly taint reputations. A
media’s potential and express exposure of these flaws can influence behavior. It is in
these areas that may be outside the law, that the media can actually change behavior by
exposure or even merely by the possibility of exposure.53

Third, today, in contrast to the media, which are trusted, there is hostility to law
enforcement. Great hostility applies to what some consider overzealous prosecution, and
is expressed by some courts as well. The Supreme Court exonerated the accounting firm
Arthur Andersen that shredded documents, which could have been of help to
prosecution.54 A federal District Court chastised the prosecution for trying to prevent
financial support to accused KPMG accounting firm partners. 55 Another example is the
case of disqualification of the Chairman of Xerox. This gentleman settled with the SEC
to pay a fine of $1 million and to be disqualified from serving on boards of corporations
for 5 years.56 So he remained the chairman of the Ford Foundation, which is a not-forprofit corporation. The Ford Foundation’s board flaunted the SEC by declaring that this
man was “an exemplary leader”!57

Fourth, compare the Disney story to the situation at Hewlett-Packard where the CEO
occupying the chair of the board of directors was involved in spying on other board
members, suspected of leaking board information to the newspapers and spying on
53

See, e.g., Carol B. Swanson, Antitrust Excitement in the New Millenium: Microsoft, Mergers, and More,
54 OKLA L. REV. 285, 312 n.199 (2001) (“In the court of public opinion antitrust law is judged on the basis
of its big cases, and in this era the case is Microsoft. Whatever one thinks of the Microsoft case, it has
enlivened popular interest in antitrust law like nothing else.”) (quoting Richard M. Steuer, Browsing the
Microsoft Case, ANTITRUST, Summer 1999, at 5)).
54
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005). For the story see Kathleen F. Brickey,
Andersen’s Fall from Grace, 81 WASH. U.L.Q. 917 (2003).
55
United States v. Stein, 440 F..Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Lynnley Browning, Judge's Rebuke
Prompts New Rules for Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2006, at 4, LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File
(a judge “issued a scathing criticism of the prosecution's tactics in a criminal case against former tax
professionals of the accounting firm KPMG. The government, the judge said, ‘let its zeal get in the way of
its judgment.’”). There is less sympathy to prosecutors that are attempting to perform their duties under
unequal circumstances with defendants that have far more resources.
56
Paul A. Allaire, Litigation Release No. 18,174, 2003 SEC LEXIS 1352 (June 5, 2003); see also TAMAR
FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY, AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD 178 (2006).
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reporters. In some states this method was illegal and the justice department entered the
scene.58 In light of continued media coverage the face-saving exit of the CEO – by
remaining a member of the board – was not sustained. She had to resign and leave within
a few days. Ovitz opened his own firm again. He did not take positions in other
corporations. Perhaps neither Ovitz nor Eisner wanted to become employee again.
Perhaps they were not invited. In both cases and without announcing disqualification, it
has become far effective through the media. Debates concerning top management’s
decisions (whether management has conflicts of interest or not), such as the decision of
whether to fight a hostile takeover, are fought not only in the Courts of Law but also in
the Court of Public Opinion.59 In such cases it may be better for the markets rather than
government to decide what is right. The media will lead to the Court of Public Opinion.

Fifth, reporters have strong incentives to discover “scoops.” Their “snooping” is more
sheltered than the fishing for information by police and government investigators. At the
same time the supervisors and editors of the newspaper have a strong incentive to ensure
the accuracy of the publication. “The New York Times reporter Jayson Blair resigned after
the newspaper discovered that he had copied articles from other newspapers and made
outright fabrications in others.60 In August 1998, the Boston Globe suspended columnist
Mike Barnicle for using a comedian’s jokes without attribution and for allegedly making

57

Verbatim, TIME, July 31, 2003, at 15, LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
Damon Darlin, Ex-Chairwoman Among 5 Charged in Hewlett Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2006, at 1,
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (explaining the charges).
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Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973,
1021 (2002) (“Supporters of board veto have used claims about stakeholder interests in the political arena,
in the courts, and in the court of public opinion.”); Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect
of Corporate Deal Structures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1601 (2006) (“Litigation involving Google is high
profile, and as the legal issues get resolved, Google must also win in the court of public opinion.”);
Stephanie Marcantonio, Case Note and Comment, What is Commercial Speech?: An Analysis in Light of
Kasky v. Nike, 24 PACE L. REV. 357, 385 (2003) (speculating that “companies will risk a potential lawsuit
in order to avoid being tried in the court of public opinion”); Lori A. Morea, The Future of Music in a
Digital Age: The Ongoing Conflict Between Copyright Law and Peer-to-Peer Technology, 28 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 195, 206-07 (2006) (noting “hostile responses by the public”; “Public backlash can be explained by
the idea that ‘suing your customers is not a winning business strategy . . . and this sort of strategy does not
play well in the court of public opinion.’ The recording industry may look to the past experience of Henry
Ford and his battle with the Association of Licensed Automobile Manufacturers and choose to exercise
caution in proceeding with legal action against its customers.”) (footnotes omitted).
60
TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY, AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD 16 (2006)
(citing Dan Barry et al., Correcting the Record; Times Reporter Who Resigned Leaves Long Trail of
Deception, N.Y.TIMES, May 11, 2003, at 1, LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File).
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up a story about two young cancer survivors. The Globe also asked for the resignation of
Patricia Smith for fabricating characters and quotations in her articles.61” That is not so
much because editors and publishers fear defamation claims as much as they are
concerned about losing their public’s trust.62 Unlike money managers or government
agents, whatever the newspaper publishes is immediately examined by a widespread
readership. Mistakes are quickly noted and reported. And true disclosure is the lifeblood
of the publication. The incentives of the media are aligned with true information and
consequent enforcement aimed at reputation.

Disadvantages
However, these strengths and incentives may have disadvantages. What if management
buys or controls a newspaper? The answer is that so long as there are different views
expressed in different media people can get a balanced view. “The market for true
information” might work in such cases.

What if the Court of Public Opinion is a flawed decision-maker?
Compare judging corporate management’s duty of care with criminal cases. Public policy
in the United States prohibits the Court of Public Opinion from intervention or influence
in such cases. The danger of unfair justice and the magnitude of the consequences to the
accused require another rule. In federal criminal procedure, the rule that governs transfer
of the hearing for prejudice63 “is intended for cases in which prejudice in the community
61

Id. (citing Sinead O’Brien, For Barnicle, One Controversy Too Many, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept.
1998, at 11, LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File).
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Id. (citing Elena Cherney & James Bandler, Publishers Face Credibility Doubts; Inflated Circulation
Data at Hollinger, Tribune Units Pose Issues for Advertisers, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2004, at B3, LEXIS,
Meganw Library, Wsjnl File).
63
FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a). Pretrial publicity may result in “a possible adverse impact upon the fairness of the
criminal trial.” WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 23.1(a), at 1069 (4th ed. 2004)
(safeguards to limit the effect of pretrial publicity include: (1) restricting public statements (restricting the
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id. § 23.2(a)-(b), at 1089-92; (6) change of venire (selecting a jury from another judicial district), id. §
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will make it difficult or impossible to select a fair and impartial jury.”64 The Rule
provides that “[u]pon the defendant's motion, the court must transfer the proceeding
against that defendant to another district if the court is satisfied that so great a prejudice
against the defendant exists in the transferring district that the defendant cannot obtain a
fair and impartial trial there.” This definition itself begs the question – what is the type
and extent of prejudice that triggers the rule? More specifically, what constitutes
prejudicial publicity? What are the factors considered in determining the prejudicial
effect of pretrial publicity?

In deciding Rule 21(a) motions, courts generally consider four factors. “First, it is
necessary that the publicity be recent, widespread and highly damaging to the
defendants.”65 “Second, it is an important consideration whether the government was
responsible for the publication of the objectionable material, or if it emanated from
independent sources.”66 Third, the court considers inconvenience to the government.
However, its analysis on this point is informed by the second factor, that is, whether, and
to what extent, the government is itself responsible for dissemination of the objectionable
material.67 “Last, [the court must consider] whether a substantially better panel can be
sworn at another time or place.”68

In addition to these four factors, another important inquiry is whether the nature of the
publicity is factual or emotional. For instance, the Court in Busby v. Dretke69 found it
significant that, “[t]he two local papers' coverage of the killings was ‘largely factual in
nature,’ tracing developments in the case rather than engaging in sensationalism.” By
focusing on the type of publicity, the court lends credence to the notion that sheer volume

64

United States v. Gressett, 773 F. Supp. 270, 277 (D. Kan. 1991) (emphasis added).
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of publicity is not by itself prejudicial. Indeed, this idea is supported explicitly in other
cases.70

The threshold evidence of prejudice is difficult to meet. It was stated that a Rule 21(a)
motion should be granted “very rarely, and only in extreme cases.”71 “[P]re-trial motions
for transfers to other Districts for trial under Rule 21(a) should be granted sparingly, in
exceptional cases requiring such unusual action, and then only when it appears with fair
certainty that it is unlikely that a fair trial can be had in the District where the indictment
is returned.” 72 One can conclude with some confidence that the Rule 21(a) motion exists
as a remedy for a defendant’s inability, due to prejudicial publicity, to secure a fair jury
trial in a given district.

Different statutory remedies exist for situations when the defendant believes that the
judge or the prosecutor is prejudiced. Because Rule 21(a) is a fairly extraordinary
measure, courts generally prefer to wait until voir dire is completed before deciding on
the motion. Presumably, they take the view that it is better to “wait and see” if a nonprejudiced jury can be selected. Accordingly, Rule 21(a) is generally available after voir
dire, and apparently, not at all available prior to indictment.

Thus, the accused in criminal cases are sheltered from the Court of Public Opinion by the
removal of their case to another jurisdiction. Why should a court encourage a judgment
by public opinion, even after the accused stood trial (as Arthur Andersen was) and were
held not liable? The answer is that the criminal cases are very different from the issue of
corporate management’s and boards’ violation of their duty of care.
70
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72
United States v. Kline, 205 F. Supp. 637, 639-40 (D. Minn.1962). The appropriate time for determining
the effect of pretrial publicity on the availability to the defendant of a fair trial, is following voir dire.
United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 732 (4th Cir. 1991); see United States v. Bando, 244 F.2d 833, 838
(2d Cir. 1957). Occasionally, where the court finds that the publicity is inherently prejudicial, it must order
a transfer prior to voir dire. Bakker, 925 F.2d at 732 (4th Cir. 1991). However, a pre-voir dire finding of
inherently prejudicial publicity is extremely rare. Further, “[b]efore a court may presume prejudice, it must
determine whether a jury substantially less subject to the publicity can be impanelled [sic] in another
location.” Id. at 733. Therefore, if a particular criminal defendant is subject to nationwide publicity, then a
71

22

There are indeed critics who have questioned the government’s authority to threaten
corporations with prosecution and thus expose management to the judgment of the Court
of Public Opinion.73 For our purpose and in our context, however, the Court has listened
to the testimony and arguments, and its decision does not create a threat without a basis.
Nonetheless, there are those who argue that bringing the case before the judicial court or
trial by publicity requires a balance, as William Scott Croft has suggested. 74

The Disney situation is not unique. Although the relationship between the CEO and the
board of directors has been recently changing, there are many corporations in which the
board does not exercise strong supervision over the CEO. There are some “imperial
CEOs” around, and there are others that collect enormous compensations.75 In these
situations it may well be that courts should not interfere and that the Court of Public
Opinion would be a more appropriate judge. Let the public determine how much
management should collect in compensation and whether management has behaved
properly; the final word could remain with the Courts of Law. They decide whether to
interfere in the boards’ decisions and whether to express their opinion about the
management’s behavior. Courts of Law can reduce legal enforcement costs and offer
another powerful and effective form of enforcement through the media.76

transfer of venue may not serve the purpose of obtaining a more fair trial, and the Rule 21(a) motion would
be, accordingly, denied.
73
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What if the relationships and behavior of the management are seriously flawed but do not
have the drawing interest that other cases do, such as “Disney?” The answer is that the
media need not cover all cases. Media is suitable for some cases, especially when they
are of interest to the public. These include mainly the powerful corporations and their
boards and management. These are the cases in which the additional support of the media
is most effective and desirable.

What if the media becomes the unfair prosecutor of management? The answer is that in
such a case the corporate board is free to resist following the media’s judgment. The
board has and can seek to tell its story. The media usually invites management to tell its
side of the story. Ken Lay went to the newspapers, even in the shadow of criminal
prosecution.77 H-P management was invited to do the same and took advantage of the
invitation.78 In fact, the management member who has been charged is terminally ill. She
emphasized her desire to clear her name and reputation. She did not seem to care about
the criminal charges against her but aimed at reestablishing her good reputation in the
Court of Public Opinion.79

The Judge’s use of obiter dicta should be considered. Is it fair for a judge to berate the
parties or witnesses in part of the decision that is not subject to appeal? Is the judge
protected from berating the witnesses or the parties in obiter dicta? The judge is protected
from any civil liability. In 1872, the Supreme Court held that, unless judicial acts are
77
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done in clear absence of subject matter jurisdiction, “judges of courts of superior or
general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such
acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or
corruptly.” 80 However, a judge who makes public statements outside the courtroom and
judicial proceedings may be subject to an action for defamation.81

Judges have rarely been disciplined under the Code of Judicial Conduct, for negative
statements about a litigant in a judicial opinion.82 However, there are few cases that
disciplined judges for negative verbal statements in conjunction with judicial
proceedings,83 and for public statements outside the courtroom.84 In In re Rome85 a judge
had filed a “Memorandum Decision” for a proceeding in which a woman found guilty of
prostitution was placed on probation. The opinion was written in poetic form and
intended to be humorous. It led to widespread publicity and a complaint from a feminist
group that the defendant “had been held up to public ridicule.”86 The court held that while
“a judge is not subject to discipline for exercising his discretion in performing a judicial
act.”87 Judges are prohibited “from the use of humor at the expense of the litigants before
them” and “should not ‘wisecrack’ at the expense of anyone connected with a judicial
proceeding who is not in a position to reply”88 and censured the judge.89
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To what extent may judges use decisions to express their opinions in obiter dicta?
“Obiter dictum” (or “dictum”) has been defined as “A judicial comment made during
the course of delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in
the case and therefore not precedential (though it may be considered persuasive.” 90 An
argument could be made that judges should avoid dicta.91 After all, if the role of a court
is to rule only on questions of law on appeal, the court should not only refuse to comment
on other legal issues but also should avoid other comment. Yet, this view has not been
widespread. In general, judges have used dicta to express their opinions and have
exercised self-control in them manner and substance of their expressions. The Disney
decision is clear about the judge’s opinion of the management’s behavior, but draws on
the evidence and the defendants’ own testimony.

The Court of Law and the Court of Public Opinion have a symbiotic relationship.
There is a reciprocal relationship between them and each affects the other. Courts have
been accused of being an unelected governing body.92 The relationships between the
Court of Law and the Court of Public Opinion can reduce the severity of this criticism.
Disney Court indirectly spoke to, and accommodated, the media but was also affected by
the information and judgment of the media. This is especially important in relation to
corporate governance that does not amount to clear violation of the law.

Mark Roe suggests that an economic model of corporate law is constrained by public
“outrage.” Outrage can
constrain executive pay from going even higher. If the internal outrage
constraint to executive pay were low, not high (that is, if the constraint
were not as weak as it is in the United States), the boundary for the
90

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1100 (7th ed. 1999)

91

See Crouchley v, Pambianchi, 182 A.2d 11, 14 (Conn. 1962) (“We should confine our comments to
matters that are germane to the questions of law presented on the appeal and not digress into areas where
we are trespassers.”) (quoting Styles v. Tyler, 30 A. 165, 179 (Conn. 1894) (“[T]he Supreme Court of
Errors is not a supreme court for all purposes, but a supreme court only for the correction of errors in
law.”)).
92
See, e.g., Amy Mayron, Judges Are on Trial in the Court of Public Opinion Hennepin County is the 1st
in the U.S. to Survey its “Customers,” Including Criminals, on Their Court Experience, ST. PAUL PIONEER
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economic model would be drawn differently. The Coasean bargain that
keeps takeovers going in the face of hostile laws, structures, and court
decisions would be less easily reversed, or not reversed at all. Takeovers
would be less frequent. If other tools of making managers loyal to
shareholders were much more imperfect, then performance of the large
public firm would degrade, and presumably ownership structures would
change: There would be a comparative advantage for closely-held
corporations over public firms.93

Thus, in the area of corporate governance that does not involve conflicts of
interest and disloyalty, judicial support to disclosure and publication by the
news media may be what we need in this day and age. While the court did
not change the positive law, 94 it did offer unusual advice to corporate
management in obiter dictum. In addition, it has provided proven material for
publication. In this respect it has broken new ground. We will never know
whether this approach is better than the one we have had until now, because
we cannot turn the clock back to experiment. It may well be that the most
brilliant corporate managers will flee the Court of Public Opinion to manage
non-public corporations, or escape abroad to manage non-U.S. corporations.
It may well be that the results of such flight will be that the United States
will fall behind other countries that offer more shelter to their corporate
managers. Whether non-public corporations and foreign countries offer these
managers better terms and freedom remains to be seen. The shareholders of
non-public corporations may exercise far more control over the corporate
managers. Foreign governments may do the same by law or rules or
informally.
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In the United States, in the area of corporate governance of public
corporations, the courts of law and the courts of public opinion may
complement each other to produce greater, more flexible, and more effective
ways to ensure the accountability of those who control very large and
powerful public corporations.
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